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[I would prefer to] see less mixed marriages. But if one doesn’t know 
any better than to mess up, let them have it. 
—Georgia Governor Lester Maddox, on interracial marriage1 
 
It’s like in golf . . . . A lot of people—I don’t want this to sound trivial—
but a lot of people are switching to these really long putters, very 
unattractive . . . . It’s weird. You see these great players with these 
really long putters, because they can’t sink three-footers anymore. And, 
I hate it. I am a traditionalist. I have so many fabulous friends who 
happen to be gay, but I am a traditionalist. 
—Donald Trump, on marriage equality2 
 
We’re a rainbow made of children 
We’re an army singing a song 
There’s no weapon that can stop us 
Rainbow love is much too strong 
—Song sung in scout camps across the land3 
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INTRODUCTION 
Before 1967, there was no recognized right to marry. States had long 
been the jealous guardians of marriage law. There had been battles in court 
over the meaning of state marriage laws, about how to reconcile conflicting 
 
   Copyright © 2017 by Joanna L. Grossman, Ellen K. Solender Endowed Chair in Women 
and the Law and Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. 
 1  Court Kills Mixed Marriage Laws, Upholds King Contempt Conviction, ATLANTA 
CONST., June 13, 1967, at 1 (quoting Georgia Governor Lester Maddox in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Loving v. Virginia). 
 2  Michael Barbaro, After Roasting, Trump Reacts in Character, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2011, 
at A17. 
 3  LYNN BAKER, A Rainbow Made of Children, on ORIGINAL SOUND TRACK MUSIC FROM 
THE MOTION PICTURE “BILLY JACK” (Warner Bros. Records 1971). 
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marriage laws across different states, and about whether federal courts had 
jurisdiction to weigh in on marriage disputes. But the Supreme Court had 
never been asked a simple question: Does the Constitution protect the right 
to marry?4 
In Loving v. Virginia, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote, for a 
unanimous court, that Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage violated both 
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.5 The law had been challenged by Richard Loving, a white 
man, and Mildred Loving, a woman with African and Cherokee blood. 
They were born and raised in Virginia, but fled to neighboring Washington 
D.C. to marry in 1958 because their home state barred a variety of racial 
pairings, including white/colored.6 The state’s law also prohibited so-called 
marriage evasion, leaving one’s home state to contract a prohibited 
marriage.7 It was this aspect of the law that the Lovings had violated with 
their D.C. marriage. The strong arm of the law was brought to bear on them 
when they returned to Virginia and tried to set up house. In an infamous 
scene, now depicted on the big screen in the 2016 movie Loving,8 three law 
enforcement officers appeared early one morning in the Lovings’ bedroom, 
shining a flashlight on them, and demanding of Richard: “What are you 
doing in bed with this lady?”9 Richard pointed to the marriage certificate 
they had proudly hung on the bedroom wall, but was told by Sheriff R. 
Garnett Brooks: “That’s no good here.”10 
The Lovings were charged and convicted under the evasion law. They 
were sentenced to one year in prison, but the sentence was suspended as 
long as the couple agreed to leave Virginia and not return together for 
twenty-five years (long enough to outlast their reproductive years, 
conveniently). They did relocate to D.C. for a period of time and tried to 
build a life there. They had not personally been much interested in civil 
rights, but contacted Attorney General Robert Kennedy to ask for help with 
this particular, personal situation. He referred them to the ACLU, which 
took their case.11 With the ACLU at their backs, they boldly crossed back 
 
 4  388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
 5  Id. at 1–2. 
 6  Id. at 2–4. 
 7  Id. at 4 (excerpting relevant Virginia statutes). Marriage evasion laws played a small but 
significant role in marriage law history, peaking after the enactment in 1912 of the Uniform 
Marriage Evasion Act. See Joanna L. Grossman, Fear and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex 
Marriage and Some Lessons from the History of Marriage and Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
87, 103–04 (2004). 
 8  LOVING (Raindog Films 2016). 
 9  David Margolick, A Mixed Marriage’s 25th Anniversary of Legality, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 
1992, at B20 (recounting the July 1958 arrest of the Lovings). 
 10  Id. 
 11  See Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical Assessment and Personal 
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over the Potomac River and made their return home known. They then filed 
motions to vacate their convictions on federal constitutional grounds.12 
The aptly-named Lovings won their gamble. The Supreme Court ruled 
in their favor, paving the way for their return home to raise three 
multiracial children spared the stigma of illegitimacy. But it was not a sure 
bet. Prior to the ruling in this case, the Supreme Court had never articulated 
a substantive principle about the right to marry. It had told us, as a side 
note, in an 1888 case about the validity of legislative divorce, that marriage 
created “the most important relation in life” and had “more to do with the 
morals and civilization of a people than any other institution.”13 But in that 
same sentence, it reminded us that marriage “has always been subject to the 
control of the legislature.”14 
I 
LOVING AND THE RIGHT TO MARRY 
The Supreme Court was no doubt interested in the Loving case 
because of the racial implications. The Warren Court was systematically 
building a wall against race discrimination, and this presented the 
opportunity for placing another significant brick. The Court reached three 
important conclusions in its analysis of the Lovings’ claim. First, it rejected 
the notion that state power to regulate marriage was unlimited. Although 
earlier opinions had spoken broadly of state control, they did so outside of 
a federal constitutional challenge. Clearly, the Court wrote in Loving, state 
laws must always conform to federal constitutional standards,15 a principle 
that had been confirmed in an important parental rights case, Meyer v. 
Nebraska,16 and a landmark reproductive rights case, Skinner v. 
Oklahoma.17 
Second, the Court concluded that Virginia’s miscegenation ban 
violated the Equal Protection Clause even though, as Virginia argued, the 
statutes “punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in an 
interracial marriage.”18 (The rejection of this “equal application” theory of 
discrimination would prove relevant and helpful decades later in the fight 
 
Narrative of Loving v. Virginia, 41 HOW. L.J. 229, 237–38 (1998).  
 12  Loving, 388 U.S. at 3. 
 13  Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). 
 14  Id. 
 15  388 U.S. at 7 (“[T]he State does not contend in its argument before this Court that its 
powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Nor could it do so . . . .”). 
 16 262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923) (invalidating state law restricting parents from teaching their 
children foreign languages in the home before the eighth grade). 
 17  316 U.S. 535, 541–43 (1942) (vacating state law mandating that certain classes of habitual 
criminals be sterilized). 
 18  Loving, 388 U.S. at 8. 
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for gay marriage equality.) The heart of the equal protection violation, 
according to the Court, was that the miscegenation laws, which only 
prohibited marriages involving white persons (people of all other races 
were free to marry out of their races), were “measures designed to maintain 
White Supremacy.”19 (The name of the law, The Racial Integrity Act, says 
it all.)20 The race-based classifications were “invidious” and were not 
justified by any sufficiently compelling purpose.21 
Third, and finally, the Court held that the Virginia ban also violated 
the Due Process Clause.22 An unnecessary step, given that the Court had 
already identified a sufficient basis for invalidating the challenged statutes, 
this aspect of the ruling launched the constitutional right to marry. As the 
Court wrote, “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of 
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men. Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our 
very existence and survival.”23 Thus, the Court concluded, “[u]nder our 
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race 
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”24  
It was not immediately clear after Loving whether the racial 
classification, and the Warren Court’s robust commitment to racial 
equality, were the driving forces behind the ruling. But the Court followed 
up several times with rulings that reinforced the idea of a constitutional 
right to marry, embodied in the concept of privacy under the Fourteenth 
Amendment that had also brought us rights related to abortion, 
contraception, parenting, and so on.25 In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a Wisconsin law that required noncustodial parents with 
child support arrearages to get court approval before marrying.26 The Court 
cited Loving in this 1978 case for the principle that marriage is a right “of 
fundamental importance” that cannot be directly or substantially infringed 
without a compelling justification.27 Any suggestion that Loving was only 
about race was put to rest here. Then, in 1987, the Court invalidated a 
Missouri prison regulation that permitted inmates to marry only with 
permission of the prison superintendent, which was to be granted only for 
 
 19  Id. at 11–12. 
 20  Id. at 6, 11 n.11. 
 21  Id. at 11. 
 22  Id. at 12. 
 23  Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
 24  Id.  
 25  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (first citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973); then citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768–70, 768 n.13 (1977); and then citing 
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 460 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972)). 
 26  Id. at 374. 
 27  Id. at 384. 
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“compelling reasons.”28 The right to marry was deemed so obvious in that 
case it was conceded by the State of Missouri; the only question in Turner 
v. Safley was whether inmates were part of the group entitled to enjoy the 
right (answer: yes).29 
Loving ended an era—states could no longer prohibit marriage on the 
basis of race—and salvaged the marriage of Richard and Mildred Loving. 
Mildred told a reporter “I feel free now . . . it was a great burden.”30 
Richard said that the ruling meant that, “[f]or the first time, I could put my 
arm around her and publicly call her my wife.”31 According to Richard, 
most of his and Mildred’s community had rooted for them to win,32 but that 
did not stop the “hostile stares” when they ventured outward. They stood 
strong until 1975, when Richard was killed by a drunk driver.33 Mildred 
lived until 2008.34 
Twenty-five years after the ruling in Loving, the sheriff who had 
arrested them remained unapologetic. “I was acting according to the law at 
the time,” he told David Margolick of the New York Times in 1992, “and I 
still think it should be on the books . . . . I don’t think a white person should 
marry a black person. I’m from the old school. The Lord made sparrows 
and robins, not to mix with one another.”35 The world, however, had mostly 
passed him by. In that quarter-century, attitudes about interracial marriage 
had shifted considerably. Behavior was slower to change, but formal 
obstacles to mixed-race marriage fell not only in state code books, but also 
in other institutions in civil society like churches and workplaces. As 
Rachel Moran concludes, while the Court could not “instantly undo the 
informal assumptions and practices that developed during three centuries of 
a ‘separate but equal’ principle in sex, marriage, and family,” the Court did 
give “ordinary Americans the freedom to rethink the role of race in their 
intimate relationships.”36 Although there is still evidence of strong same-
race preference within most racial groups for dating and marriage,37 there 
 
 28  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82 (1987). 
 29  Id. at 95 (“We disagree with petitioners that Zablocki does not apply to prison inmates.”). 
 30  Helen Dewar, Victor in Mixed Marriage Case Relieved: “I Feel Free Now . . .,” WASH. 
POST, June 13, 1967, at A11. 
 31  Simeon Booker, The Couple that Rocked the Courts, EBONY, Sept. 1967, at 78, 78. 
 32  See State Couple “Overjoyed” by Ruling, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 13, 1967, at 
B1 (quoting Richard after the Supreme Court’s decision: “Everyone here really wanted us to win 
the case . . . . They were as happy as we were at the decision.”). But see The Crime of Being 
Married, LIFE, Mar. 18, 1966, at 82, 85 (“It doesn’t matter to folks around here. They just want to 
live and be left alone.”). 
 33  See Pratt, supra note 11, at 241.  
 34  See Douglas Martin, Mildred Loving, Who Battled Ban on Mixed-Race Marriage, Dies at 
68, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2008, at B7. 
 35  See Margolick, supra note 9, at B20. 
 36  RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY 99 (2001). 
 37  See, e.g., Raymond Fisman et al., Racial Preferences in Dating, 75 REV. ECON. STUD. 
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has been a steady increase in the United States of the number of individuals 
who marry someone of a different race—up to twelve percent in 2013. 
Compared to members of other races, whites are the least likely to do so.38 
Attitudes change before behavior, and these numbers do reflect increasing 
social acceptance of interracial marriage. In 2014, thirty-seven percent of 
Americans labeled the increase of intermarriage as a “good thing for 
society,” an increase from twenty-four percent only four years earlier.39 
II 
LOVING AND MARRIAGE BY SAME-SEX COUPLES 
But as attitudes and behavior surrounding interracial marriage have 
slowly but discernibly evolved, the national conversation moved on to a 
new topic: marriage equality for same-sex couples. Mildred Loving 
witnessed the change and, although she had generally stopped giving 
interviews by that time, she issued a statement on the fortieth anniversary 
of the Supreme Court’s ruling in her case “urging that gay men and 
lesbians be allowed to marry.”40 By that anniversary in 2007, the fight was 
well underway. 
After a few false starts in the early 1970s,41 the quest for marriage 
equality began in earnest in the early 1990s. Advocates had filed suit in a 
variety of states, raising only state-law claims so as to avoid an unfavorable 
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, alleging a constitutional right of 
same-sex couples to marry. Loving was front and center in these cases—it 
had established that state marriage laws must conform to federal 
constitutional norms and identified at least one class of marriages that 
could not be prohibited. But what else did it stand for? The first test of its 
scope came in Baehr v. Lewin, in which the Hawaii Supreme Court set the 
 
117, 131 (2008) (finding strong racial preferences in dating, even in a “population of relatively 
progressive individuals”). 
 38  See Wendy Wang, Interracial Marriage: Who Is ‘Marrying Out’?, PEW RES. CTR. (June 
12, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/12/interracial-marriage-who-is-
marrying-out/ (finding that in 2013, seven percent of whites married spouses of a different race, 
as compared to nineteen percent of blacks, twenty-eight percent of Asians, and fifty-eight percent 
of American Indians). 
 39  Id. 
 40  Martin, supra note 34, at B7. 
 41  Three early cases rejected the argument that bans on same-sex marriage were analogous to 
bans on interracial marriage. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1973) (rejecting argument that same-sex marriage ban violated the Federal Constitution); Baker v. 
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (same), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); 
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Wash. 1974) (rejecting analogy to Loving because same-sex 
couples are “being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of the recognized 
definition of that relationship”). On the history through 2010, see JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY 
AMERICA 142–55 (2011). 
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stage for the legalization of same-sex marriage in that state.42 In Baehr, the 
court read Loving to reject any argument rooted in religious mandates and 
dismissed the idea that the “Deity had deemed such a union intrinsically 
unnatural.”43 The Virginia trial court had indeed justified its ruling on 
religious grounds, explaining the long sentence given to the Lovings in 
these terms: 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and 
he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with 
his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact 
that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to 
mix.44 
But in the Hawaii court’s view, the Supreme Court’s reversal of the 
conviction also signified a repudiation of this reasoning. The Hawaii 
Supreme Court wrote that “we do not believe that trial judges are the 
ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving amply 
demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that customs 
change with an evolving social order.”45 
Baehr was the public debut of the so-called “Loving analogy.” One of 
Loving’s significant contributions to the marriage equality fight, though, 
was its rejection of the equal application justification for discrimination. In 
Baehr, plaintiffs had argued that a ban on marriage by same-sex couples 
constituted sex discrimination because men were not allowed to marry 
men, but women were; and women were not allowed to marry women, but 
men were.46 Classic sex discrimination. The Hawaii court agreed, citing 
Loving for support. The Supreme Court in Loving had refused to accept the 
argument that the Virginia law was nondiscriminatory because both blacks 
and whites were restricted in their choice of marital partners. Substitute sex 
for race, the Baehr court reasoned, to yield “the precise case before us 
together with the conclusion that we have reached.”47 A ban on marriage by 
same-sex couples is sex discrimination, plain and simple, the court 
concluded. And, under the Hawaii constitution, sex-based classifications 
merit strict scrutiny.48 
The ruling in Baehr loomed large over the country, as people began to 
hope or fear that when same-sex couples could marry in Hawaii—which 
seemed inevitable after the state high court’s ruling, but ultimately never 
materialized—they would flood to other states and demand recognition of 
 
 42  852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  
 43  Id. at 63. 
 44  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting the trial court). 
 45  Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63. 
 46  See id. at 50. 
 47  Id. at 68. 
 48  Id. at 63–64. 
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their unions. Baehr catalyzed legislators and voters to mobilize in their 
opposition to marriage equality. Congress soon would enact the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), which would refuse recognition to same-sex 
marriages for any federal-law purpose, and more than forty states followed 
with mini-DOMAs enshrined in their state codebooks, constitutions, or 
both.49 
In the two decades following Baehr, marriage equality was litigated 
everywhere and at every level. In those cases, Loving played many roles. 
There were cases that wrestled with the “equal application” argument, as 
the court did in Baehr, but the results were mixed.50 Perhaps more 
significantly, Loving’s bigger legacy was litigated—how broad was the 
right to marry? Despite the Court’s rulings in Zablocki51 and Turner,52 
which made clear that even restrictions without a racial component might 
violate the right to marry, some courts clung to the racial narrative in 
refusing to recognize a right of same-sex couples to marry. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court, for example, rejected the same-sex plaintiffs’ reliance on 
Loving because “the heart of the case was invidious discrimination based 
on race” and the holding was premised on the “fact-specific background of 
that case, which dealt with intolerable racial distinctions.”53 The Vermont 
Supreme Court refused to see the same “institutionalized racism” in the 
exclusion of same-sex couples as it saw in the exclusion of interracial 
couples.54 Heteronormativity just doesn’t resonate the way white 
supremacy does, perhaps. Courts were also cautious about getting too far 
ahead of legislative and public opinion. Miscegenation bans were deeply on 
the decline by 1967, while same-sex couples were prohibited from 
marrying in every state. This argument of course lost some sway as states 
began to legalize same-sex marriage, beginning with Massachusetts in 
2004; Connecticut in 2008; Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire and the 
District of Columbia in 2009; and then a cascade of states from 2011 to 
2015.55 Although each development on the way to marriage equality for 
 
 49  See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, 119 Stat. 2419 (1996). On related 
developments, see GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 147–49. 
 50  Compare, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 989 (Wash. 2006) (holding that 
the ban on same-sex marriage creates an illegal sex-based classification) with Standhardt v. 
Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. 2003) (same). 
 51  434 U.S. 374, 387–91 (1978) (striking down a Wisconsin statute which mandated that 
individuals with court-ordered child support obligations could not get married without court 
approval). 
 52  482 U.S. 78, 97–100 (1987) (striking down a Missouri statute which prohibited inmates 
from marrying each other or civilians without approval from the prison superintendent). 
 53  Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 210 (N.J. 2006). 
 54  Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999). 
 55  On the developments in chronological order, see Gay Marriage Timeline, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.pewforum.org/2008/04/01/gay-marriage-timeline/.  
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same-sex couples was riveting in real time, their significance in the 
historical narrative is eclipsed by the two cases that ended the fight, United 
States v. Windsor56 and Obergefell v. Hodges.57 
In Windsor, the widow of a same-sex spouse, who had been married in 
Canada, sought (and won) a refund of estate taxes that would not have been 
owed had the federal government given effect to the couple’s same-sex 
marriage.58 Transfers to a legal spouse at death are exempted from the 
estate tax, but the IRS denied Windsor’s request for a refund on the 
grounds that she was not a “surviving spouse” for estate tax purposes.59 At 
the time, New York did not allow for the celebration of valid same-sex 
marriages, but it did give effect to those that were validly celebrated 
elsewhere.60 Edith Windsor challenged the estate tax assessment on the 
ground that the federal-law provision of DOMA was unconstitutional. A 
federal district judge ruled in her favor, reasoning that Congress had no 
legitimate reason for refusing to recognize marriages based solely on the 
sexual orientation of the parties.61 She ordered, without a stay of the 
judgment, that the Internal Revenue Service refund over $350,000 to the 
decedent spouse’s estate.62 
The ruling was appealed to the Second Circuit, but before a decision 
came from that court, both parties petitioned for certiorari before judgment, 
asking the Supreme Court to take the case immediately.63 While the petition 
was pending, the Second Circuit issued its ruling.64 It affirmed the trial 
court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that sexual orientation 
classifications merit heightened scrutiny and that the government did not 
have sufficiently good reasons for this one.65 
The question presented by the petitioner to the Supreme Court was 
this: “Whether Section 3 of DOMA violates the Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same 
sex who are legally married under the laws of their State.”66 In its order 
granting review, the Supreme Court asked the parties to brief and argue not 
 
 56  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (finding that DOMA’s definition of marriage unconstitutional). 
 57  135 S. Ct. 2584, 2588 (2015) (finding that same-sex marriage is a constitutionally 
protected right). 
 58  133 S. Ct. at 2682. 
 59  Id.  
 60  Id. at 2683. Subsequently, the New York legislature passed a law to legalize same-sex 
marriage. See Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 749 (McKinney).  
 61  Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“With no other 
rational basis to support it, Congress’s interest in economy does not suffice.”). 
 62  Id. 
 63  Windsor, 135 S. Ct. at 2684. 
 64  Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 65  Id. at 181–88. 
 66  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, 
2012 WL 3991414 (Sept. 11, 2012). 
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only the question presented, but also the question whether the Bipartisan 
Legal Advisory Group, which stepped in when the Department of Justice 
ceased defending DOMA in court because of its determination that the 
provision was unconstitutional, had standing to defend DOMA in court.67 
In the opinion on the merits, the Supreme Court invalidated the federal-law 
provision of the Defense of Marriage Act on equal protection grounds.68 
Loving was cited only once in Windsor for the very certain proposition that 
although marriage laws have “long been regarded as a virtually exclusive 
province of the States,” state laws defining and regulating marriage must 
conform to federal constitutional standards.69 But this was offered not only 
as a truism that bears repeating, but also as a set up for the Court’s 
determination that Congress’s decision to categorically exempt one type of 
marriage from every type of benefit and obligation was inconsistent with its 
past behavior. Indeed, most federal laws and programs defer to state-law 
determinations of marital and parent-child status, even when allocating 
significant benefits and burdens, such as Social Security benefits and taxes. 
Given the federal government’s usual practices, its sudden refusal to give 
effect to one class of marriage for every purpose was a discrimination of an 
“unusual character” that raised an inference of animus, a motivation the 
Court had determined in a previous case was not sufficient to survive even 
the lowest form of judicial scrutiny.70 The Court rejected Congress’s 
ostensible motivations for the law as either false or insufficient, and it 
struck the law down. Justice Scalia, in a strongly worded dissent, predicted 
that Windsor would certainly give way to a full-blown right of marriage 
equality.71 Just two years later, his prediction came to pass. 
As one might expect, Loving played a much more significant role in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, in which the scope of the constitutional right to 
marry, first recognized in Loving, was front and center. But the pathway 
from Loving to Obergefell included one very important stop: Lawrence v. 
Texas.72 In that case, the Court held that a state law criminalizing same-sex 
sodomy ran afoul of the right of privacy protected in the substantive 
component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Two men 
were arrested after the police, dispatched on a report of a weapons 
disturbance, encountered them in their apartment engaged in a sexual act. 
 
 67  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786, 787 (2012) (granting certiorari). 
 68  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).  
 69  Id. at 2691 (internal citation omitted).  
 70  Id. at 2692 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). 
 71  The hand-wringing conclusion of his dissent expressed deep skepticism “that a 
constitutional requirement to give formal recognition to same-sex marriage is not at issue here . . . 
. I promise you this: The only thing that will ‘confine’ the Court’s holding is its sense of what it 
can get away with.” Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 72  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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They were convicted under a Texas law criminalizing “deviate sexual 
intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”73 By a 6–3 majority, 
the Court, in a majority opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
invalidated the law—and all anti-sodomy laws, even those that apply to 
both same-sex and opposite-sex couples. The Court never expressly labeled 
the conduct at issue a “fundamental” right, but it spoke in language we 
associate with such rights. It wrote broadly about a sphere of privacy broad 
enough to include choices about intimate relationships and physical 
expressions that arose from them. Two aspects of Lawrence were essential 
in paving the way for the Obergefell opinion thirteen years later. First was 
the Court’s discussion of fundamental rights analysis, in which it observed 
that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the 
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”74 This would have 
obvious implications in the marriage equality context when arguing for 
recognition of a right that, in that particular iteration, had never before been 
granted. Second, the Court dispensed with the notion that moral 
disapproval, without more, could constitutionally justify the state’s 
infringement of an important liberty interest.75 This would also be 
important in the later battle, particularly as the standard governmental 
defenses of same-sex marriage bans seemed to get less and less traction in 
court. 
James Obergefell and John Arthur, a gay couple who had been 
together for over two decades, made only a modest request of their home 
state of Ohio. They wanted their marriage to be acknowledged on Arthur’s 
death certificate. Arthur was suffering with end-stage ALS (Lou Gehrig’s 
Disease), a progressive and fatal illness, but the couple wanted to marry 
before he died. They flew from Ohio, which did not allow same-sex 
couples to marry, to Maryland, which did, on a medical transport plane. 
Because it was too difficult to move Arthur given his debilitating illness, 
the marriage was solemnized in a ceremony on the plane as it sat on the 
tarmac. Arthur died, as expected, just three months later.76 Ohio law did not 
permit recognition of a marriage by a same-sex couple for any reason, 
including for vital statistics records. Obergefell sued, arguing that Ohio’s 
refusal to give effect to a validly celebrated marriage from Maryland 
violated his equal protection and due process rights under the Federal 
Constitution. A federal district court sided with Obergefell, ordering Ohio 
 
 73  Id. at 563.  
 74  Id. at 572 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring)). 
 75  Id. at 559 (stating that “this Court’s obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate 
its own moral code”). 
 76  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594–95 (2015). 
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to record Arthur’s status at death as “married.”77 But the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the decision whether 
to allow or disallow marriages by same-sex couples was reserved to the 
states.78 
The appellate court reversed all trial court rulings in cases from other 
states within its jurisdiction. It found no constitutional problem with a 
Michigan law that prevented a lesbian couple from jointly adopting a 
special needs child because their out-of-state marriage could not be 
recognized there.79 Nor with Tennessee’s refusal to recognize the valid 
New York marriage of an Army reservist who settled there with his 
husband after a year’s deployment to Afghanistan.80 Nor, finally, with the 
denial of a marriage license to a Kentucky couple with thirty-one years 
under their relationship belt and two teenage children.81 These cases 
involved sixteen couples (two with only a surviving partner) who had been 
denied either the right to marry in a state within the Sixth Circuit, or the 
right to have an out-of-state marriage recognized, or both. Although the 
Sixth Circuit reversed all the district court rulings in its jurisdictions, every 
other federal appellate court facing a similar challenge did the opposite—
they struck down state bans on the celebration and recognition of same-sex 
marriage.82 
At stake in Obergefell was the constitutional validity of the bans all 
over the country that denied same-sex couples the right to marry and the 
right to have otherwise valid marriages recognized. The Court looked to 
Loving as the Court’s first and clearest statement that “the right to marry is 
protected by the Constitution”83—indeed, in the Loving Court’s words, 
marriage is “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit 
of happiness by free men.”84 It then looked to Loving as one of the more 
“instructive precedents” that allowed the Court to sidestep Baker v. Nelson, 
where, in 1972, it had dismissed the writ of certiorari in a same-sex 
marriage case “for want of a substantial federal question.”85 Baker had 
lurked in the background of marriage equality litigation, perhaps standing 
for the proposition that the Supreme Court had already ruled on the merits 
of the question presented in Obergefell. But the Court this time around was 
 
 77  Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013). 
 78  DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 79  DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 80  Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. Tenn. 2014). 
 81  Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014). 
 82  See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 119 (10th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 
(4th Cir. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
 83  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).  
 84  Id. (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). 
 85  409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972). 
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dismissive of Baker as one of the “assumptions defined by the world and 
time of which it is a part.”86 Baker was contrasted with Loving, which 
“identified essential attributes of [the right to marry] based in history, 
tradition, and other constitutional liberties inherent in this intimate bond.”87 
It helped the Court understand why the right to marry is protected in the 
first place. Loving, according to the Obergefell court, established the 
“abiding connection between marriage and liberty.”88 “[D]ecisions 
concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can 
make.”89 Moreover, Loving helped establish that the freedom to marry 
“resides with the individual” and that there is dignity in the bond between 
any two people as well as in the autonomy to “make such profound 
choices.”90 
Loving was important to refuting a key argument by the State of Ohio, 
which was trying to defend its ban. Ohio suggested that the Court needed to 
engage in so-called Glucksberg analysis, the process for determining 
whether a new right is indeed fundamental and deserving of constitutional 
protection.91 This analysis was defined in Washington v. Glucksberg, a case 
in which the Court was asked to consider whether individuals have a right 
to physician-assisted suicide.92 But the Obergefell Court beat back this 
suggestion, concluding that the plaintiffs were not seeking recognition of a 
new right any more than the plaintiffs in Loving were seeking a new “right 
to interracial marriage.”93 In 1967 and in 2015, the question was whether 
there was “sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class” from an 
already-established right.94 
Finally, Loving was relevant to the Obergefell Court’s understanding 
of the interconnected relationship between the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses. The Loving Court could have stopped its opinion after 
invalidating Virginia’s miscegenation ban on equal protection grounds. But 
it continued with a full and independent analysis of the law’s validity under 
the Due Process Clause, a move that arguably led to the robust protection 
for the right to marry that would follow.95 With both liberty and equality at 
 
 86  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.  
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. at 2599.  
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. 
 91  See id. at 2602 (“[R]espondents refer to Washington v. Glucksberg . . . which called for a 
‘careful description’ of fundamental rights.” (citation omitted) (quoting Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724 (1997))).  
 92  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 704–05. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id.  
 95  See id. at 2603–05 (discussing the important implications of the Loving Court’s due 
process analysis). 
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stake, the right to marry must be jealously guarded. 
In the end, the Obergefell Court held that states cannot deny same-sex 
couples the right to marry without running afoul of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.96 Almost fifty years after the ruling in Loving v. Virginia, and 
at a very different social time, the opinion began broadly and poetically—
or language better reserved, as Justice Scalia suggested in a biting dissent, 
for a fortune cookie. “The Constitution,” it opened, “promises liberty to all 
within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow 
persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”97 This 
sentence left no mystery as to the outcome of the case and established the 
tone and substance of the opinion that followed. 
Thus, Justice Kennedy did for gay couples what Chief Justice Warren 
did for interracial couples: He recognized their humanity and their right, 
rooted in liberty and equality, to partake in this most essential of 
institutions. He let the rainbow loving begin. 
The pathway from Loving to Obergefell is indisputable, but Loving did 
more than just open the door to marriage equality. Prior to Loving, there 
were only a handful of cases, mostly involving attempted intrusions into 
parental autonomy, in which the Supreme Court considered overriding a 
state law regarding family status or operation based on constitutional 
constraints.98 But the body of constitutional family law grew dramatically 
beginning in the 1970s, an arc triggered in part by the Supreme Court’s 
intervention into Virginia marriage law in Loving. According to Professor 
Pamela Karlan, “Loving is seen today as a critical point in the revival of 
substantive due process.”99 The number of specific rights recognized as 
falling within that sphere increased significantly in the two decades after 
Loving was decided.100 
CONCLUSION 
There is now a lengthy patchwork of cases cited for the principle that 
individuals have “the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, 
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy,”101 and Loving 
 
 96  Id. at 2604–05.  
 97  Id. at 2593. 
 98  See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (affirming, against Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge, a parent’s conviction for violating child labor laws by using a child to 
distribute religious pamphlets); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating, on due 
process grounds, a statute that banned the teaching of foreign languages to children who had not 
passed the eighth grade). 
 99  Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1463 n.7 (2004).  
 100  See id. at 1456 (“The Court’s decisions in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe had 
dramatically expanded constitutionally protected autonomy.”). 
 101  Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052, 1055 (1987) (denying certiorari) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing, for example, Loving, Zablocki, Skinner v. Oklahoma, Meyer, 
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is virtually always amongst those cited. Loving thus provides support for 
the right to not marry as well as the right to marry, and the related rights to 
make decisions over a “broad range of private choices involving family life 
and personal autonomy.”102 The Supreme Court includes Loving among the 
litany of cases collectively establishing the contours of the right to privacy: 
“Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are 
among associational rights this Court has ranked as ‘of basic importance in 
our society,’ rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the 
State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.”103 
Perhaps the Supreme Court has closed the loop now on fundamental 
rights. The future is impossible to predict. But the past is the past, and we 
know the role that Loving played in shaping it. Objections to marriages of 
same-sex couples were as strong, if not stronger, that those of interracial 
couples. Whether the objections spoke of robins and sparrows, or strange 
metaphors about the length of golf putters, they were deeply held and hard 
fought. But in both cases, the arc of history bent towards justice—and 
marriage equality for all. The Obergefell marriage lasted only a short time, 
but it will play a lasting role in history, just as the Loving marriage did. 
As Jim Obergefell wrote on the day the decision was handed down, 
“[m]y husband John died 20 months ago, so we’re unable to celebrate 
together the Supreme Court’s decision on the case that bears my name, 
Obergefell v. Hodges. . . . America has taken one more step toward the 
promise of equality enshrined in our Constitution, and I’m humbled to be 
part of that.”104 
 
Moore, Pierce, etc., to invalidate a public employer’s prohibition on unmarried employees’ living 
together in an intimate relationship).  
 102  Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965 (1983) (denying certiorari) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(considering validity of police department’s antinepotism policy as applied to a nonmarried 
couple); see also Robert A. Destro, Introduction: Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. 
Virginia After 30 Years, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1207, 1218 (1998) (noting Loving’s support for 
“federal oversight of State power to define, regulate, and order sexual, marital, and family 
relationships”).  
 103  M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (citation omitted) (invalidating a Mississippi 
statute requiring a woman to prepay record preparation fees in order to appeal an order 
terminating her parental rights). Loving is cited in many pivotal privacy cases. See Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (upholding conclusive presumption of husband’s paternity 
over constitutional challenge from child’s biological father); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 
n.18 (1980) (refusing to extend the right to privacy to include a right to Medicaid reimbursement 
for a medically necessary abortion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) 
(striking down New York ban on distribution of non-prescription contraceptives); Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (invalidating zoning ordinance that distinguished 
between nuclear and non-nuclear families for purposes of residential restrictions). 
 104  Jim Obergefell, My Husband, MEDIUM (June 26, 2015), 
https://medium.com/@ObamaWhiteHouse/my-husband-69362c9d63df#.kf4nnsvhv. 
